

Alethic modal logic in Aristotle's Analytics

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Abstract: In this work, the authors try to prove that, although the Stagirite does not use its own terminology for the logic schemes that analyzes, we can interpret them as equivalent to modus ponens, modus tollens and the statement of the consequent in a Phylonian conditional. We defend the idea that Aristotle's Analytics can be interpreted within the current S5 modal logic, without the need to postulate a supposed additional rule that would have formal validity problems.

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